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This page is mostly a wishful thinking. It does not reflect the current state of ONAP security. It's rather where we would like to be.

ONAP introduction

ONAP from the milky way point of view

From the very optimistic perspective ONAP is an independent system in the outer space that provides interfaces for User, Admin and OSS/BSS system in the North and xNF in the South and uses interfaces provided by NFVI and xNF.


ONAP deployed on kubernetes

ONAP has to be deployed on some infra. Currently it's kubernetes.


ONAP deployed on kubernetes with external databases

As most of applications ONAP requires some persistence layer in form of databases. As ONAP follows micro-service architecture principle in theory each component could ship its own database but in practice in commercial deployments its desired to configure ONAP to use external DB engines already existing in operators infrastructure.


ONAP deployed on kubernetes with external databases and external IAM

Obviously it's hard to imagine operator that would like to have one more identity DB to managed specifically for ONAP thus ONAP should have the ability to integrate with external IAM system.



ONAP deployed on kubernetes with external databases and external IAM and external CA

Most of the operators probably already have Certificate Authority server running in their network and a requirement that all services should present a valid certificate signed by this CA. This means that ONAP should provide the ability to integrate with external CA instead of shipping own one.



Defining system boundaries

Provided interfaces

  1. Admin/User/OSS/BSS interfaces are REST.
  2. xNF southbound interfaces are VES events (protocol depends on the collector used)

Used interfaces

  1. Kubernetes interface is REST. Exact supported version of kubernetes has to be specified by every ONAP release
  2. Database interface depends on DB type but only encrypted communication should be used
  3. xNF interface depends on particular xNF but all xNFs should support secure protocols for communication
  4. NFVI interface is REST (usually OpenStack or Kubernetes)
  5. IAM interface is Open ID Connect
    1. if operator already has OIDC compatible solution ONAP should just use it
    2. if operator has Identity Provider (LDAP/Kerberos/etc) external OIDC solution should be deployed (ie keycloak) with operator IdP configured as backend
    3. In testing environment external OIDC solution should be deployed and bootstraped with test users
  6. CA interface can be one of:
    1. Manual interaction by deployer that will retrieve certificates and the bootstrap ONAP instance with them
    2. One of automated certificate retrieval protocols (ACME, CMPv2 etc)
    3. In testing environment external CA (and ONAP should use automated certificate retrieval as described in b) solution should be deployed

Requirements on interfaces

Kubernetes

  1. Cluster should be configured according to CIS Kubernetes Benchmark
  2. Encryption at rest should be properly configured to ensure that secrets are never stored in the plain text

Databases

  1. Each DB should be configured according to corresponding CIS guideline
  2. All DB should be already created or ONAP should be provided with user that is capable of creating DB
  3. If ONAP creates a DB a dedicated user account with privileges limited to that DB should be created. Password used for this user cannot be hardcoded in ONAP source.

xNF

  1. Define by the  ONAP VNF security requirements

NFVI

  1. Defined by the CNTT Reference Architecture 1 & 2

IAM

  1. IAM must support OpenID Connect standard

CA

  1. If automated certificate retrieval is used one of .... has to be supported by the CA (CMPv2, ACME, SCEP)

Requirements on exposed interfaces

  1. North and south interfaces should be separated (ie different instance of ingress controller) to provide operator deployment flexibility
  2. All Northbound interfaces musts be protected using TLS
  3. All Northbound interfaces must support SSO
  4. All Northbound interfaces must support RBAC
  5. All roles used in ONAP have to be documented
  6. All forms should validate and sanitize their input provided by the user
  7. Southbound interfaces must satisfy VNF security requirements
  8. ...

Internal ONAP security requirements

  1. ONAP should not include any user database
  2. ONAP should not implement RBAC on it's own but depend on external component to provide it
  3. ONAP should not implement CA functionality but depend on external component to provide it
  4. ONAP components should use mTLS instead of username/password for authentication between each other
  5. ONAP should configure network policies so that only desired components can communicate with each other
  6. ONAP must store all sensitive material (keys, passwords) in Kubernetes secrets
  7. ONAP docker images have to be hardened (see CIS Docker Benchmark)
  8. ONAP must use only approved docker base images
  9. ONAP should log all important events to a centralized location
  10. ONAP should log security audit logs to a secure location
  11. ONAP logs cannot include any secret material (e.g., passwords and keys)
  12. All ONAP components must support OIDC
  13. ...

Current ONAP security model

Cloud-Native ONAP security model

  1. Every component in its own namespace
  2. All "common" components in separate namespaces
  3. No implicit dependencies between common components and ONAP
  4. No nodeports unless really required
  5. istio-ingress used as ingress controller
  6. Up to 4 entrypoints for deployment. For example
    1. simpledemo.onap.org (UI)
    2. south.simpledemo.onap.org (southbound interfaces)
    3. iam.simpledemo.onap.org (keycloak)
    4. api.simpledemo.onap.org (API for OSS/BSS)
  7. Every entrypoint exposed as a separate ingress instance
  8. Every ingress gateway terminates the TSL and re-encrypts the payload before sending to the destination component using mTLS
  9. ISTIO network policy must be configured so that only authorized services can communicate with each other
  10. Auth between services done using certs via mTLS
  11. OpenID Connect used to authenticate user
  12. In testing deployment keycloak is used but can be replaced with anything else compatible with OIDC
  13. Cert-manager and citadel used to retrieve certificates
  14. Kubernetes is configured to use encryption at rest plugin
  15. ISTIO automated sidecar injection is configured in underlying Kubernetes
  16. No root pods
  17. All DB considered external
  18. Documented roles
  19. Ability to integrate with LDAP, Kerberos, AAF as IdP
  20. Ability to retrieve the certificate from external CA



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