This is a working document.

The below matrix is a representation of the log management categories (lifecycle) in relation to the two categories of run-time logs (logs of ONAP events, logs of events from services orchestrated by ONAP).

Team Members

Actions

30 Jul 2021

Amy: List of proposed events that should be collected from ONAP and Metadata
Muddasar: Determine if there is a standard terminology regarding logging architecture terms. Eg., Are the categories in the above table industry accepted?
- **There probably a body of work we can reference that spells this out. ACTION: Literature review for that: No standard terms, but some popular standard formats like BSD, Syslog (IETF), Common Event Format (CEF), by Arcsight. OWASP, NIST and Major Cloud Vendors have guidance in user docs or SDK regarding logs and formats. NIST SP 800-92 can be found here https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-92.pdf
  
  Application logs some time are split into Application Access and Application Operations. Other major Category in older literature is focusing on Operating System, in Containerized deployments this can be Docker and host OS, Node logs. We should consider listing in best practice some of these categories that do not fall within Application Container.
  
  Do we need to specify format type? WebAPIs, Datanbases and applications way have slightly different format requirements.
Fabian: Initial investigation of ONAP responding to security events.

13 Aug 2021

Review Requirements list Amy put together
Muddasar to provide links to NIST security logging standards:
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-92.pdf
Fabian: Initial investigation of ONAP responding to security events.
Bob to provide Orchestration logging events
Log Template as suggested by Chakir on Tuesday call ( Apache 2 log template as an example. Can we review work from Logging enhancement project?

Key

X: Indicates what is in-scope for ONAP

BP: Indicates a best practice

P: Partially in-scope (group consensus is mixed).

Definitions:

Application: This refers to runtime containerized application
Container: This refers to the container platform and orchestration software that ONAP interfaces with. For example, docker and K8S.

Infrastructure: This refers to any physical, virtualization, element managers, and/or operating system components.

From a 2017 AT&T Doc on ONAP Logging

"Application logging” refers to logs written by ONAP component “applications”.

"System/infrastructure logging” refers to the separate/related set of logs produced by software components not developed for ONAP (e.g. DBMS, application container, web servers, ‘middle boxes’, JVM, OS, hypervisor, etc.) that are used in the implementation of these components." (See reference #4).

Scope

	Phase	1 (ONAP Based Events)			2 (events from services orchestrated by ONAP)
		ONAP Components (e.g., DCAE, SDC, etc.)			Services (xNF, xApps)
	Lifecycle	Application	Container (k8s and Docker)	Infrastructure	Application	Container	Infrastructure
How they are generated	Generation	X	X
How they are made available	Collection	X	X
	Monitoring
	Alerting
	Response	P	P		X	X

Phase 1 will focus on logs of ONAP events.

Phase 2 will focus on logs of events from services orchestrated by ONAP

Notes

At a high level there are 5 broad categories in regards to Security Event Management (Or is this a Security Event Lifecycle?)

Generation

Within ONAP both containers and infrastructure generate raw data that have security concerns.
- Containers (xNFs)
  - That is documented here: https://wiki.onap.org/download/attachments/100895473/2021-02-22_LoggingRequirementEvents_v9.pptx?version=1&modificationDate=1619018452000&api=v2
- Infrastructure (Docker and K8S)
  - There are a set of logs that both Docker and K8S generate that relate to security monitoring.
  - That is documented here: https://wiki.onap.org/download/attachments/103419713/Logging%20-%20ATTACK%20to%20SECCOM_v3.pptx?version=1&modificationDate=1622560207000&api=v2

These below refer to the ONAP (Application and Infrastructure Columns)

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

Further refinement for this document only the keywords REQUIRED, RECOMMENDED and OPTIONAL will be used.

PLEASE CONSIDER THE BELOW THE MOST UP TO DATE LIST. While transferring data here from various spreadsheets and PPTs there were several errors corrected (duplicates, wrong ID number, wrong VNF REQ Numbers).

Logging Practice Requirements (Proposed)

Security Logging Best Practice

ID	Type	Description	Reference
CON-LOG-REQ-19	REQUIRED	The container MUST be capable of automatically synchronizing the system clock daily with the Operator’s trusted time source, to assure accurate time reporting in log files. It is recommended that Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) be used where possible to eliminate ambiguity owing to daylight savings time. Sync time source The container MUST be capable of automatically synchronizing the system clock daily with the Operator’s trusted time source, to assure accurate time reporting in log files. It is recommended that Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) be used where possible to eliminate ambiguity owing to daylight savings time.	R-629534
CON-LOG-REQ-20	REQUIRED	The container and container application MUST use the STDOUT for security logs collection	REQ-374
CON-LOG-REQ-F1	REQUIRED	Using systems and applications with native logging functionality is essential. This function MUST be taken into account during any design and development process.
CON-LOG-REQ-F6	REQUIRED	The container application SHALL contextualize events (log enrichment) e.g: Timestamp, IP address having generated the logs, user concerned, functionality concerned, error of application, detail of the error, all access to a resource, success of application, etc…
CON-LOG-REQ-13	REQUIRED	The container MUST have security logging for the container and container application active from initialization.	R-84160
CON-LOG-REQ-15	REQUIRED	The container MUST detect when its security audit log storage medium is approaching capacity (configurable) and issue an alarm.	R-63330
CON-LOG-REQ-F9	REQUIRED	An event log rotation policy MUST be formalized and implemented on all logging system equipment.
CON-LOG-REQ-18	REQUIRED	The container MUST support the storage of security audit logs for a configurable period of time.	R-54816
CON-LOG-REQ-16	REQUIRED	The container MUST support the capability of online storage of security audit logs.	R-41252
CON-LOG-REQ-F8	REQUIRED	A disk partition MUST be dedicated to storing event logs on the equipment that generates them
CON-LOG-REQ-F7	REQUIRED	Logs MUST be automatically exported to a different physical machine than the one that generated them
CON-LOG-REQ-F2	REQUIRED	It is recommended that no processing MUST be performed on the logs before they are transferred. (no classification, it is not the behavior of an application to define the categories of an event) Note: this needs to be converted into a requirement
CON-LOG-REQ-F5	RECOMMENDED	It is recommended the container application SHOULD adopt a tree structure for the storage of event logs.
CON-LOG-REQ-14	REQUIRED	The container MUST protect all security audit logs by standard operating system access control mechanisms, by sending to a remote system, or by encryption.	R-56920
CON-LOG-REQ-F4 CON-LOG-REQ-F10	REQUIRED	Access to logs MUST be write restricted to a limited number of accounts with a need to know
CON-LOG-REQ-21	RECOMMENDED	The container SHOULD provide the capability of maintaining the integrity of its static files using a cryptographic method. (Fabian) Propose to remove because this is a hardening requirement, not a logging requirement (Bob) Instead of removing this is now in the Best Practices category and we can make it a recommendation.	R-465236
CON-LOG-REQ-12 CON-LOG-REQ-XX	REQUIRED	The container and container application MUST NOT include an authentication credential, e.g., password, in the security audit logs, even if encrypted. The container and container application MUST NOT include a sensitive information in the log	R-04982
CON-LOG-REQ-17	REQUIRED	The container MUST generate security audit logs that can be sent to Security Analytics Tools for analysis.	R-04492

Security Event Generation Requirements (Proposed)

REQUIRED, RECOMMENDED and OPTIONAL

ID	Type	Description	Reference
CON-LOG-REQ-1	REQUIRED	The container and container application MUST log successful and unsuccessful authentication attempts, e.g., authentication associated with a transaction, authentication to create a session, authentication to assume elevated privilege.	R-54520
CON-LOG-REQ-2		The container and container application MUST log logoffs.	R-55478
CON-LOG-REQ-3		The container and container application MUST log starting and stopping of security logging.	R-13344
CON-LOG-REQ-4		The container and container application MUST log success and unsuccessful creation, removal, or change to the inherent privilege level of users.	R-07617
CON-LOG-REQ-5		The container and container application MUST log connections to the network listeners of the container.	R-94525
CON-LOG-REQ-6		The container and container application MUST log the addition, deletion or modification of files in the container.
CON-LOG-REQ-MP05		The container MUST log lifecycle events
CON-LOG-REQ-MP07		Container administration services activities and executed commands MUST be logged. (e.g., Build requests, Runtime commands) (Available in docker Daemon Logs)	T1609, T1612
CON-LOG-REQ-MP08		The container MUST log API calls (such as: syscalls, those that deploy containers, Discovery API). (Available in docker daemon log).	T1610, T1204, T1611, T1068, T1552, T1613, T1525
CON-LOG-REQ-MP09		The container MUST log creation of scheduled jobs in containers. ( Available at the K8S level)	T1053
CON-LOG-REQ-MP10		Image registry events MUST be logged (e.g., additions)	T1204
CON-LOG-REQ-MP06		Log anonymous requests

Steps for approval: POC → Best Practice → Global Requirement

Metadata for Security Events (Proposed)

Working Session Agenda

Meeting	Working Items
9/17/2021	Presentation to 2 PTL's to gather security logging feedback and to consider participating in a POC in the Jakarta release Focus is on logging metadata. Toine Siebelink Toine Siebelink, Configuration Persistence Service Project Vijay Kumar Vijay Venkatesh Kumar, Data Collection Analytics and Events Project Comments form Toine and VJ: Toine Will this work for non-transactional based logs? Should this current framework cover more? An extra field to identify that this is a security log. Perhaps constrain with an ENUM. Commented that he believes the container ID information is important to capture. VJ: Since this scope is security he would like to see this as a generalized structure used across ONAP. DCAE has 30 containers and would like format to be applicable to all logging. Both agreed that this is an important topic that should be brought forward to PTL meeting.
9/24/2021	Discussion: Byung-Woo Jun Is possible to combine a POC and Best Practice for a single release. If so, is this something that is possible for Toine's and VJ's projects? Get on PTL meeting calendar to present security Logging Metadata

Security Log Structure

Timestamp

Log Type

Log Level

Transaction ID

Status Code

Severity

Container Data

Protocol

Service / Program Name

Log Message

Image Tag / Name

Image Digest

ID

Name

Principal ID

Role / Attribute ID

NOTE:

Grey Box	indicate that a (yet to be determined) container logger function / service will provide security log metadata.
White Box	indicate the developer of a container or container application will provide security log metadata/

Example:

From Fabian:

2021-09-10T14:50:37.929Z|d855a2c6-c58f-4d8d-b199-3382d11504d2|http-nio-8083-exec-5|/manage/health|kube-probe/1.19|||DEBUG|500||Headers : X-Content-Type-Options:nos

ISO 8601 TIMESTAMP: 2021-09-10T22:41:40+0000
Log Level: INFO
Transaction ID: 15a28073-3cce-495b-abb4-00771fa011b7
Status Code: COMPLETE
Severity: NONE
Container Image Name:
Container Image Digest:
Container ID:
Container Name:
Principal ID

Docker PS
CONTAINER ID: 5c6768cf2c81
IMAGE: onap/sdnc-image:latest

Security Log Field Definitions

Type Synonyms:

REQUIRED: SHALL OR MUST
RECOMMENDED: SHOULD
OPTIONAL: MAY

ID	Type	Field Name	Description	Reference
CON-SEC-LOG-01 ~~CON-LOG-REQ-7~~	REQUIRED	Timestamp	The container and container application MUST log the field “date/time” in the security audit logs. The value should be represented in UTC and formatted per ISO 8601, such as “2015-06-03T13:21:58+00:00”. The time should be shown with the maximum resolution available to the logging component (e.g., milliseconds, microseconds) by including the appropriate number of decimal digits. For example, when millisecond precision is available, the date-time value would be presented as, as “2015-06-03T13:21:58.340+00:00”.	R-97445 v1.3 Spec
	REQUIRED	Log Type Name	The container and container application MUST log the field "Log type" in security audit logs. This is a proposed field that came out from discussion with 2 PTLs on 9/17/2021. This is meant to be a filter to distinguish from other types of logs tha tother projects a recurrently generations. This field will adhere to the following ENUM ::= "AUDIT" \| "METRICS" \| "ERROR" \| "DEBUG" \| "SECURITY"	(4)
CON-LOG-REQ-MP04	REQUIRED	Log Level	The container and container application MUST use an appropriately configured logging level that can be changed dynamically. The intention of this field is to not cause performance degradation via excessive logging. This field will adhere to the following ENUM ::= "FATAL" \| "ERROR" \| "WARN" \| "INFO" \| "DEBUG" \| "TRACE" The verbosity of the logging increases from left to right. How do we synchronize these levels across projects and what the logging API they are using?	R-28168 (4)
CON-LOG-REQ-MP13	REQUIRED	Transaction ID	The container and container application MUST log Transaction ID A transaction ID is a universally unique value that identifies a single transaction request within the ONAP platform. Its value is conformant to RFC4122 UUID. This value is readily and easily obtained in most programming environments.	v1.3 Spec (4)
CON-LOG-REQ-10	REQUIRED	Status Code	The container and container application MUST log a "status code" in the security audit logs. This field indicates the high level status for transactional or sub operational events. This field will adhere to the following ENUM ::= "COMPLETE" \| "ERROR" \| "INPROGRESS" COMPLETE when the request is successful ERROR when there is a failure INPROGRESS for states between the COMPLETE and ERROR.	R-15325 v1.3 Spec (4)
CON-SEC-LOG-11	REQUIRED	Severity	The container and container application MUST log the severity level of a processing event. This is to be used for error reporting in internal processing in conjunction with the status code field. This field will adhere to the following ENUM ::= "NONE" \| "WARN" \| "ERROR" \| "FATAL"	(4)
CON-LOG-REQ-MP03		Container Image Name / Tag	The container and container application MUST log the Container Image Name/Tag. The image name/tag is as returned by the docker images command. NOTE: Images are not required to have tags
CON-LOG-REQ-MP11		Container Image Digest	The container and container application MUST log the container image digest. The digest is a cryptographic digest as returned by the docker images --digests command.	T1036, T1525
CON-LOG-REQ-MP01		Container ID	The container and container application MUST log the container ID. The container ID is the same that is returned by the docker ps -q command. NOTE: The container ID is unique for life time of the the container instance. Once the container is killed, this ID goes away.
CON-LOG-REQ-MP02		Container Name	The container and container application MUST log the container name. This is the unique name of the image ( webserver, FW, DCAE01). This is returned by the docker ps command.
CON-LOG-REQ-11	REQUIRED	Principal ID	The container and container application MUST log the Principal identity of a requestor in the security audit logs. This field should contain the identification name of the client application (user agent, client id, user, user id, login ID, non-person entity (NPE), Token, etc.) of the entity accessing or invoking the service or API (Service / Program Name). This field should contain the identification of the entity (user agent, client id, user, user id, login ID, non-person entity (NPE), Token, etc.) that made the request of the service or API indicated in the Service/Program Name field. For a serving API that is authenticating the request, this should be the authenticated username or equivalent. There are not a concrete set of values for this field. The developer should keep the following set of guidelines when determining what value to use or set for this field. Use the short name of your component, e.g. xyzdriver. Values should be human-readable. Values should be fine-grained enough to disambiguate subcomponents where it's likely to matter. This is subjective. Be consistent: your component should ALWAYS report same value. REF: See PartnerName in v1.3 and (4).	R-89474 v1.3 Spec
CON-LOG-REQ-MP12	REQUIRED	Role / Attribute ID	The container and container application MUST log the Role or Attribute ID of the Principal identity of the entity accessing the requested service or API. Note: The group ID is in reference to a Role or Attribute as part of a RBAC or ABAC scheme.	N/A
CON-LOG-REQ-8	REQUIRED	Protocol	The container and container application MUST log the field “protocol” in the security audit logs. This refers to the communication mechanism for a request. The value of this field should be representative of the OSI application layer protocol. This is represented as a decimal formatted TCP/IP port number.	R-25547
CON-LOG-REQ-9	REQUIRED	Service / Program Name	The container and container application MUST log the field “service or program used for access” in the security audit logs. This intention is to capture the service name endpoint or an externally advertised API invoked, e.g., where are you connecting to. This is represented as a URI or URL.	R-06413 v1.3 Spec (4)
	REQUIRED	Log Message	The free text payload of a log event.	(6)

Best Practices and Risk Analysis for an Operator

<TODO>

Best Practices for operators to collect and correlate logs

<TODO>

Tagging

Muddasar put your thoughts here :Adding metadata or label tags close to log source or by the log source is a good practice. Tags can be added by a local driver for Service and Container ID/name (fqdn) as logs received by logging driver. As ONAP XNF containers will log to stdout/stderr I/O streams, a host or sidecar based collector should be able to add tags for sending source prior to moving the logs to centralized collection location.

As part of log generation other information elements can be added by the application. we should consider what needs to be a requirement: Event_Type (Access, Operation, Error). Logging enahncement project in the past listed format and options, see Logging Enhancements Project Proposal.

Collection

There currently is a SECCOM proposal that specifies what type of data should be logged where it should be logged to.
- [REQ-374] ONAP shall use STDOUT for logs collection - ONAP JIRA
How these logs would be collected and aggregated is specified by the ONAP NextGen Presentation by Byung.
- ONAP Next Generation Security & Logging Architecture#ONAPLogging
- old presentation slide deck (see the above link for the latest on) https://wiki.onap.org/download/attachments/103416997/ONAP-Next-Generation-Security-Logging-2021-5-25-v1.pptx?version=1&modificationDate=1621953519000&api=v2

Proposed Collection of Container Logs

[CON-LOG-REQ-13] The container MUST have security logging for the container and container application active from initialization. [Reference: R-84160]

[CON-LOG-REQ-20] The container and container application MUST use the STDOUT for security logs collection [Reference: REQ-374]

Data Stewardship

What is the data life cycle within ONAP?

What happens to the data as it goes to log stash?

Will it go to AAI?

TODO: Draw out a few scenarios

If there is no consumer it may be written to archive.

Archival data vs live data

Monitoring

Includes Enrichment, Analysis, and Reporting.
It is expected that this function out of scope for ONAP. A CSP / MNO will make used of a SIEM. ONAP's role is to provide a means to export security event data. This is where analytics are stored and applied to the data the is ingested from ONAP.
Presentation by Fabian pertaining to Analysis: ONAP Logs Security Managment1.pptx

Alerting

Possibly to include mitigation and actions.
If we expect ONAP to respond to security events in a closed loop manner, then there needs to be a way for events generated by the SIEM to be ingested back into ONAP.

Response

Comments from Chakar, paraphrased, (7/20/2021 SECCOM Meeting)

We need to disambiguate "Logging" vs "Data Collection".
Logging from ONAP and Logging from xNF are not the same.

There are two types of responses to consider.

ONAP responding to a security event in a service.
ONAP responding to a security event within ONAP. ONAP's ability to respond to itself is only possible in some limited and specific situations. What are these situations?

Terms

This is place where we can standardize our language.

Security Data: This is raw data that by itself may not be enough to indicate a security event.
Security Event:
Analytic

QUESTIONS (Or Advanced Use Cases)

In terms of security logging, should we handle ONAP components differently than Service Components hosted in ONAP?
Muddasar: Any transections carried out for a service(5G, virtualization and SDN) should generate Application Logs by ONAP Containers. I would think life cycle management of a service (instantiation and changes) may have some information buried in the ONAP logs. Transections events for service design, service deployment within and outside the ONAP components thru ONAP APIs should be part of the ONAP logging.
How do we handle the use case where ONAP is being used to deploy and manage a security infrastructure?
Muddasar: I think it may be similar to above. I think ONAP will not be used to do OAM of security infrastructure, with exception that ONAP may play a role in the instantiation of some of security network elements. Example: A service design may require deployment of FW/IDS/IPS. ONAP transection may be limited to requesting VIMs/EMs to deploy/change network elements and perhaps deploy base configuration. Logs generated by network elements may flow thru a different path(different virtualized enclaves) to a different collector similar to XNFs.
What about security events in regards to the closed loop model? Adversarial AI will be an issue that will need security monitoring in the near future. Does this mean that orchestration / life cycle data from the DCAE needs to ingested by a SIEM?
Muddasar: I believe Data Exposure Service (DES) can provide this facility. I think question here should be that once logs are created, are there any internal ONAP consumers for that information?

References

Attachments

ONAP Logs Security Management rouzaut , FEB-20201	Logging Source Reference Diagrams Muddasar Ahmed , JUL-2021
Proposed Container Logging Requirements Amy Zwarico, rouzaut, FEB-2021	Container Logging Requirements GAP Analysis against ATT&CK Robert Heinemann , Muddasar Ahmed MAY-2021

ONAP Security Event Management - DRAFT