Jakarta Best Practice Proposal for Standardized Logging Fields - v2

The container and container application MUST log the field “date/time” in the security audit logs. 

The value should be represented in UTC and formatted per ISO 8601, such as “2015-06-03T13:21:58+00:00”. The time should be shown with the maximum resolution available to the logging component (e.g., milliseconds, microseconds) by including the appropriate number of decimal digits. For example, when millisecond precision is available, the date-time value would be presented as, as “2015-06-03T13:21:58.340+00:00”.

BeginTimestamp

Timestamp

R-97445

v1.3 Spec

The container and container application MAY log the field "Log type" in security audit logs.

This field will adhere to the following ENUM ::= "AUDIT" | "METRICS" | "ERROR" | "DEBUG" | ""

This is here for legacy purposes.  Older projects used to generate 4 separate log files.  However since projects now will output all logs to STDOUT and STDERR this field is here to give projects adhering to the old standard a way to specify those log file types.

NOTE: This field is optional but a placeholder is still required to be outputted.  That is why the "" is included in the ENUM.

p_marker

The container and container application MUST use an appropriately configured logging level that can be changed dynamically.

The intention of this field is to not cause performance degradation via excessive logging. 

This field will adhere to the following ENUM ::= "FATAL" | "ERROR" | "WARN" | "INFO" | "DEBUG" | "TRACE"

The verbosity of the logging increases from left to right.

R-28168

(4)

Trace ID

The container and container application MUST log Trace ID

A trace ID is a universally unique value that identifies a single transaction request or a series of related log events within the ONAP platform. Its value is conformant to RFC4122 UUID. This value is readily and easily obtained in most programming environments. 

v1.3 Spec

(4)

The container and container application MUST log a "status code" in the security audit logs. 

This field indicates the high level status for transactional, APIs calls, or sub operational events.  

This field will adhere to the following ENUM ::= "SUCCESS" | "INPROGRESS" |"FAIL_WARN" | "FAIL_ERROR" | "FAIL_FATAL"

• SUCCESS when the operation is successful.  This represents a normal case.
• INPROGRESS for states that are not COMPLETE or one of the FAIL_* enums.
• The following ENUMs represents when an event is not successful or abnormal / failure cases.
  • FAIL_WARN: Indicates that something has not worked as it should.  Program operation may continue without issue but depends on the particular circumstances of the execution environment.
  • FAIL_ERROR: Indicates that something serious has gone wrong.  Program may be recoverable through error routines.
  • FAIL_FATAL: Also indicates that something serious has gone wrong but is not recoverable.

From an end user perspective these categories should not be considered strict due to the absence of contextual information of holistic operations. There may be some circumstances where FAIL_WARN may be more serious than FAIL_ERROR.  Regardless, from a developer view, FAIL_WARN, FAIL_ERROR, and FAIL_FATAL should be viewed as increasing importance and understand that the end user will need to provide additional context for their comprehension and execute and potential action from the particular failure.

R-15325

v1.3 Spec

(4)

The container and container application MUST log the Principal identity of a requestor in the security audit logs. 

This field should contain the identification of the entity (user agent, client id, user, user id, login ID, non-person entity (NPE), Token,  etc.)  that made the request of the service or API indicated in the Service/Program Name field. For a serving API that is authenticating the request, this should be the authenticated username or equivalent.

NOTE: The CPS project uses a framework that provides this field. 

R-89474

 R-89474

v1.3 Spec

The container and container application MUST log the field “service or program used for access” in the security audit logs.

This intention is to capture the service name endpoint or an externally advertised API invoked, e.g., where are you connecting to. This is represented as a URI or URL. 

NOTE: The CPS project uses a framework that provides this field. 

R-06413

v1.3 Spec

(4)

detailMessage

The container and container application MUST log the Container Image Name/Tag.

The image name/tag is as returned by the docker images command.

NOTE:  Images are not required to have tags

Container Image Digest

The container and container application MUST log the container image digest.

The digest is a cryptographic digest as returned by the docker images --digests command.

The container and container application MUST log the container ID.

The container ID is the same that is returned by the docker ps -q command.

NOTE: The container ID is unique for life time of the the container instance. Once the container is killed, this ID goes away.

Role / Attribute ID

The container and container application MUST log the Role or Attribute ID of the Principal identity of the entity accessing the requested service or API.

Note: The group ID is in reference to a Role or Attribute as part of a RBAC or ABAC scheme.

3/4/2022: Team decided this field is out of scope for yellow fields for now.  Potentially revisit for a later phase. 

• This is a nice to have for forensics purposes.  Although this field could be looked up, in the course of a forensics investigation this information may no longer be available. 
• Also, it is undecided that this field belongs in the yellow fields or green fields.

The container and container application MUST log the field “protocol” in the security audit logs.

This refers to the communication mechanism for a request.  The value of this field should be representative of the OSI application layer  protocol. This is represented as a decimal formatted TCP/IP port number.

R-25547