"The project MUST have performed a security review within the last 5 years. This review MUST consider the security requirements and security boundary." – Best Practices Badging Criterion

Your Answers-Please Explain	SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations
Yes, the majority of the CPS team & PTL are aware of security best practices and are experienced in mitigation and vulnerability resolution.	+1

Implement Secure Design

Do the committers and PTL apply secure design principles when reviewing software for merging?

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Your Answer-Please Explain	SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations
Yes CPS team/PTL/committers review and look for security issues and recommend fixes before merging.	+1

Know Common Errors

Do the committers and PTL understand commonly found errors (and how to counter or mitigate them)? Do they apply these principles when reviewing software for merging?

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Your Answers-Please Explain	SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations
Yes, the CPS team & PTL are aware of common security risks and how to mitigate them. There are also security checks in our CI pipeline	+1

No Leaked Credentials

Do the committers and PTL verify that there are no non-test credentials and no non-test private keys in code to be merged?

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Your Answer-Please Explain	SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations
We do have clear text default credentials in our docker-compose files if not provided (Only used for testing). The users of CPS are expected to override credentials and strategies around these.	+1

Security Documentation

Documentation Architecture

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If so, please provide a URL to the pages on wiki.onap.org or onap.readthedocs.io that have the architecture or high level design. If not, please describe the high level design here using one or more paragraphs.

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Your Answer-Please Describe	SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations
Yes, CPS architecture documentation can be found @ https://docs.onap.org/projects/onap-cps/en/latest/architecture.html

Documentation Security

Does your project have a description of what a user of your project can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project, (In other words, what are its 'security requirements'?)

If so, please provide a URL to the page(s) on wiki.onap.org or onap.readthedocs.io. If not, please describe the security requirements here using one or more paragraphs.

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These are the security requirements that the software is intended to meet.

There needs to be:

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_{[documentation_security S]}

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None available

CPS don’t have security requirements apart from the authentication on our rest API wherein username and passwords are configurable

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Assurance Case

Does your project actually meet its documented security requirements?

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*Page is being updated for the next release to reflect that the architecture diagram reflects the latest release. (https://gerrit.onap.org/r/c/cps/+/133557)

The ONAP architecture diagram (London-R12 Architecture diagram) is displayed on Configuration Persistence Service Project wiki as part of explaining the project's concept

Please refer to the latest ONAP architecture diagram.

London-R12 Architecture Diagram

Documentation Security

Does your project have a description of what a user of your project can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project, (In other words, what are its 'security requirements'?)

If so, please provide a URL to the page(s) on wiki.onap.org or onap.readthedocs.io that describe how the project meets its security goals. If . If not, please describe the security requirements here ( using one or more paragraphs) how the project meets its security goals.

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For ONAP, somewhere in the project's description, there needs to be (as indicated above)These are the security requirements that the software is intended to meet.

There needs to be:

a description of how the project met the threat model,a description of how the project maintains the trust boundaries,an argument that secure design principles have been applied, andan argument that common implementation security weaknesses have been countered.

This may be combined with the "documentation security" document.

_{[assurance_case S]}

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clear identification of trust boundaries,
how the software expects to deal with the threat model and trust boundaries

_{[documentation_security S]}

Your Answer-Please Describe

SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations

None available

CPS don’t have security requirements apart from the authentication on our rest API wherein username and passwords are configurable

[TH] Please add a statement about this to the end of your security requirements section/document. At a minimum, it should indicate how you protect your username and password configurations. (See other questions on hashing of secrets and use of crypto.)

Vulnerability Mitigation

Vulnerabilities Critical Fixed

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Configuration Persistence Service Project#CPSSECURITYREQUIREMENTS

Please refer to the latest ONAP architecture diagram.

London-R12 Architecture Diagram

Please elaborate this statement: "Usernames and passwords are configurable by the clients via configuring the application .yml file".

Expectation: passwords are not in yml file. The yml should point to user store (e.g. LDAP or K8s secrets).

+1

Assurance Case

Does your project actually meet its documented security requirements?

If so, please provide a URL to the page(s) on wiki.onap.org or onap.readthedocs.io that describe how the project meets its security goals. If not, please describe here (using one or more paragraphs) how the project meets its security goals.

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All critical vulnerabilities should be fixed rapidly after they are reported.

_{[vulnerabilities_critical_fixed P]}

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Yes, CPS sonarcloud reports can be found @

https://sonarcloud.io/organizations/onap/projects?search=cps&sort=-coverage

For ONAP, somewhere in the project's description, there needs to be (as indicated above):

a description of how the project met the threat model,
a description of how the project maintains the trust boundaries,
an argument that secure design principles have been applied, and
an argument that common implementation security weaknesses have been countered.

This may be combined with the "documentation security" document.

_{[assurance_case S]}

Your Answer-Please Describe

SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations

Configuration Persistence Service Project#CPSSECURITYREQUIREMENTS

CPS don’t have security requirements apart from the authentication on our rest API wherein username and passwords are configurable.

CPS has no logging of sensitive information such as usernames and passwords in plain text. The log files are only accesible withing the authorized users of the application deployment.

CPS is in the process (as part of ONAP service mesh implementation) of migrating to service mesh, currently CPS application is fully-compatible with all the requirements, to provide encryption in transit to avoid unauthorized accesses and data breaches.

CPS does not run docker containers or services as 'root'.

Please add these statements to a new Security Assurance section just after: Configuration Persistence Service Project#CPSSECURITYREQUIREMENTS. — these statements are the same as under security requirements

Also add statements that indicate how you protect your username and password configurations. (See other questions on hashing of secrets, use of crypto and permissions on files.)

Vulnerability Mitigation

Vulnerabilities Critical Fixed

Have you closed all issues filed against your project in sonarcloud that are CRITICAL or BLOCKERs?

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All critical vulnerabilities should be fixed rapidly after they are reported.

_{[vulnerabilities_critical_fixed P]}

Your Answer-Please Explain

SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations

Yes, CPS sonarcloud reports can be found @

https://sonarcloud.io/organizations/onap/projects?search=cps&sort=-coverage

https://sonarcloud.io/organizations/onap/projects?search=ncmp-dmi-plugin&sort=-coverage

+1

Vulnerabilities Fixed 60 Days

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Your Answer-Please Explain

SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations

Yes. Critical vulnerabilities/issues are compiled by SECCOM periodically and CPS project team resolves them in-time for current/prev release.

We also check sonarcloud reports on a weekly basis and if needed action is taken.

+1

Non-Cryptographic Software Questions

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Cloak

The project results MUST check all inputs from potentially untrusted sources to ensure they are valid (an *allowlist*), and reject invalid inputs, if there are any restrictions on the data at all.
Note that comparing input against a list of 'bad formats' (aka a *denylist*) is normally not enough, because attackers can often work around a denylist. In particular, numbers are converted into internal formats and then checked if they are between their minimum and maximum (inclusive), and text strings are checked to ensure that they are valid text patterns (e.g., valid UTF-8, length, syntax, etc.). Some data may need to be 'anything at all' (e.g., a file uploader), but these would typically be rare.

_{[input_validation S]}

Your Answer-Please Explain

SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations

Our application expects (any) client to upload models and data to be stored.

These models and data are validated via the 3rd party tool - OpenDayLight Yang parser which is part of CPS and not a separate microservice. These are only stored once the parser accepts that it is valid and returns an exception for invalid models and data.

Additionally, inputs to all REST endpoints are validated, e.g. CM handle IDs, CPS paths, timestamps

+1

Hardening

Does your project apply hardening mechanisms so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities?

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Cloak

If you compile code into binary executables, do you use

compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector)?
compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior?
special build features like Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (if available)?

If your project provides a web user interface:

Does it require the hardening headers: Content Security Policy (CSP), HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), X-Content-Type-Options (as 'nosniff'), and X-Frame-Options?
If your web site were to be passed to a website such as <securityheaders.com>, would you get a grade of A or B?
Are administrative web pages shown or listed only if the logged in user is an administrator?
Are your JavaScript and CSS served from separate files?
Do you use HTTP to HTTPS redirects?
Do you use HSTS?
If appropriated, do you do rate limiting to prevent DOS attacks?
Do you employ measures to resist Cross Site Request Forgeries (CSRFs)?
Do your cookies use settings to counter Javascript-based attacks, set secure=true, and counter CSRF using a SameSite value?
Do you protect use of target='_blank' with rel="noopener noreferrer"noreferrer"?

If your project generates email:

Do you take measures for rate limiting?
Do you encrypt the email addresses that might be stored in a database?

If your project generates emailuses a database:

Do you take measures for rate limiting?
Do you encrypt the email addresses that might be stored in a database?

If your project uses a database:

Do you encrypt values that are sensitive?

_{[hardening SG]}

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CPS does not have a UI and does not use javascript

The application uses Swagger for RESTful API, wherein it is set that Authorization headers are required for accessing API documentation.

encrypt values that are sensitive?

_{[hardening SG]}

Your Answer-Please Explain

SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations

CPS does not have a UI and does not use javascript

The application uses Swagger for RESTful API, wherein it is set that Authorization headers are required for accessing API documentation.

When CPS is run with docker, the services use usernames and passwords that are stored as environment variables.

While for testing purposes, all credentials are hard-coded, for deployments, CPS uses K8s secrets which are generated and stored as the application is deployed.x

How are usernames and passwords stored?

Are passwords stored hashed where CPS acts as an authenticator?

Please refer to comment above in Documentation security.

As it is not part of the production: +1

Cryptographic-specific Software Questions

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Your Answers-Please Explain	SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations
CPS does generate random UUIDs for notifications. These UUIDs are generated via the built in java libraries (java.util.UUID).	+1

Crypto Weaknesses

Does your software depend on any cryptographic algorithms or modes that have known serious weaknesses?

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how about storage of passwords?

Your Answer-Please Explain

SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations

N/A

Usernames and passwords are configurable by the clients via passing the environment variables for use in application.yml file.

When CPS is run with docker, the services use username and passwords that are stored as environment variables.

For deployments, CPS uses K8s secrets which are generated and stored as the application is deployed.

Please refer to comment above in Documentation security.

Crypto Working

Does your software depend on any cryptographic algorithms that are known to be broken? Toggle cloak

Cloak

The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol.
ECB mode is almost never appropriate because it reveals identical blocks within the ciphertext as demonstrated by the ECB Penguin, and CTR mode is often inappropriate because it does not perform authentication and causes duplicates if the input state is repeated. In many cases it's best to choose a block cipher algorithm mode designed to combine secrecy and authentication, e.g., Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and EAX. Projects MAY allow users to enable broken mechanisms (e.g., during configuration) where necessary for compatibility, but then users know they're doing it.

_{[crypto_working P]}

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algorithms that are known to be broken?

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Cloak

The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol.
ECB mode is almost never appropriate because it reveals identical blocks within the ciphertext as demonstrated by the ECB Penguin, and CTR mode is often inappropriate because it does not perform authentication and causes duplicates if the input state is repeated. In many cases it's best to choose a block cipher algorithm mode designed to combine secrecy and authentication, e.g., Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and EAX. Projects MAY allow users to enable broken mechanisms (e.g., during configuration) where necessary for compatibility, but then users know they're doing it.

_{[crypto_working P]}

Your Answer-Please Explain

SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations

Usernames and passwords are configurable by the clients via passing the environment variables for use in application.yml file.

When CPS is run with docker, the services use username and passwords that are stored as environment variables.

For deployments, CPS uses K8s secrets which are generated and stored as the application is deployed.

Please refer to comment above in Documentation security.

Crypto Keylength

Does your software generate any keys? If so, do they use any default key-lengths that are considered insecure?

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Your Answers-Please Explain	SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations
CPS does not generate any keys	+1

Crypto Algorithm Agility

Does your software use cryptographic algorithms? If so, can a user of ONAP switch the algorithm if one is found to be broken?

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how about storage of passwords?

Your Answers-Please Explain

SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations

This does not apply

For deployments, CPS uses K8s secrets that are generated and stored as CPS is deployed.

CPS relies on java.UUID mechanism for generating unique identifiers.

+1

Crypto Certificate Verification

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Your Answers-Please Explain

SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations

CPS has not switched to HTTPS but the plan is to switch to enabling service mesh which should take care of HTTPS/TLS encapsulation.There has been a POC created as part of this plan. **is compliant and compatible with the ongoing service mesh implementation (see https://gerrit.onap.org/r/c/oom/+/124287) for ONAP.

CPS service port names has been changed to include http in name.

+1

Crypto Credential Agility

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[TH] how about storage of usernames and passwords for REST access?

Your Answers-Please Explain

SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations

Usernames and passwords are configurable by the clients via passing the environment variables for use in application.yml file.

CPS does not store or save authentication credentials, the only information saved by CPS is data and models either via client's input or initial input from the application start up.

When CPS is run with docker, the services use username and passwords that are stored as environment variables.

For deployments, CPS uses K8s secrets which are generated and stored as the application is deployed.

Please refer to comment above in Documentation security.

Crypto TLS1.2

Does your software support HTTPS? If so, is the minimum version allowed TLS1.2?

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Your Answers-Please Explain

SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations

CPS has not switched to HTTPS but the plan is to switch to enabling service mesh which should take care of HTTPS/TLS encapsulation.There has been a POC created as part of this plan. **is compliant and compatible with the ongoing service mesh implementation (see https://gerrit.onap.org/r/c/oom/+/124287) for ONAP.

CPS service port names has been changed to include http in name.

+1

Crypto Used Network

Does your software have network communications inbound or outbound? If so, do you support secure protocols for all such network communications?

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Your Answers-Please Explain

SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations

CPS only communicates with components within ONAP.

CPS's primary communication is through HTTP.

CPS uses KAFKA, and as a listener, in KAFKA we use PLAINTEXT communication, which is also KAFKA's default for communication, at a later stage the Kafka provider ( eg. Apache, Confluent, or Strimizi Kafka [which is planned to be used] ) can enable the security by default i.e the default way of communication.

CPS components are deployed within a pod, all communications in PLAINTEXT are within the pod. Any communication outside the pods is managed via the service mesh.

+1

Crypto Verification Private

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Your Answers-Please Explain

SECCOM Feedback / Recommendations

CPS has not switched to HTTPS but the plan is to switch to enabling service mesh which should take care of HTTPS/TLS encapsulation.There has been a POC created as part of this plan. **is compliant and compatible with the ongoing service mesh implementation (see https://gerrit.onap.org/r/c/oom/+/124287) for ONAP.

CPS service port names has been changed to include http in name.

+1

Versions Compared

Old Version 14

New Version Current

Key

Implement Secure Design

Know Common Errors

No Leaked Credentials

Security Documentation

Documentation Architecture

Documentation Security

Assurance Case

Documentation Security

Vulnerability Mitigation

Vulnerabilities Critical Fixed

Assurance Case

Vulnerability Mitigation

Vulnerabilities Critical Fixed

Vulnerabilities Fixed 60 Days

Non-Cryptographic Software Questions

Hardening

Cryptographic-specific Software Questions

Crypto Weaknesses

Crypto Working

Crypto Keylength

Crypto Algorithm Agility

Crypto Certificate Verification

Crypto Credential Agility

Crypto TLS1.2

Crypto Used Network

Crypto Verification Private

Page Comparison

Versions Compared

Old Version 14

New Version Current

Key

Implement Secure Design

Know Common Errors

No Leaked Credentials

Security Documentation

Documentation Architecture

Documentation Security

Assurance Case

Documentation Security

Vulnerability Mitigation

Vulnerabilities Critical Fixed

Assurance Case

Vulnerability Mitigation

Vulnerabilities Critical Fixed

Vulnerabilities Fixed 60 Days

Non-Cryptographic Software Questions

Hardening

Cryptographic-specific Software Questions

Crypto Weaknesses

Crypto Working

Crypto Keylength

Crypto Algorithm Agility

Crypto Certificate Verification

Crypto Credential Agility

Crypto TLS1.2

Crypto Used Network

Crypto Verification Private